We consider Max-min Share (MmS) allocations of items both in the case where items are goods (positive utility) and when they are chores (negative utility). We show that fair allocations of goods and chores have some fundamental connections but differences as well. We prove that like in the case for goods, an MmS allocation does not need to exist for chores and computing an MmS allocation -if it exists -is strongly NP-hard. In view of these non-existence and complexity results, we present a polynomial-time 2-approximation algorithm for MmS fairness for chores. We then introduce a new fairness concept called optimal MmS that represents the best possible allocation in terms of MmS that is guaranteed to exist. For both goods and chores, we use connections to parallel machine scheduling to give (1) an exponential-time exact algorithm and (2) a polynomial-time approximation scheme for computing an optimal MmS allocation when the number of agents is fixed.
Introduction
The fair allocation of indivisible items is a central problem in economics, computer science, and operations research [Aziz et al., 2015; Brams and Taylor, 1996; Bouveret et al., 2015; Lipton et al., 2004] . We focus on the setting in which we have a set of N agents and a set of items with each agent expressing utilities over the items. The goal is to allocate the items among the agents in a fair manner without allowing transfer of money. If all agents have positive utilities for the items, we view the items as goods. On the other hand, if all agents have negative utilities for the items, we can view the items as chores. Throughout, we assume that all agents' utilities over items are additive.
In order to identify fair allocations, one needs to formalize what fairness means. A compelling fairness concept called Max-min Share (MmS) was recently introduced which is weaker than traditional fairness concepts such as envyfreeness and proportionality [Bouveret and Lemaître, 2014; Budish, 2011 ]. An agent's MmS is the "most preferred bundle he could guarantee himself as a divider in divide-and-choose against adversarial opponents" [Budish, 2011] . The main idea is that an agent partitions the items into N sets in a way that maximizes the utility of the least preferred set in the partition. The utility of the least preferred set is called the MmS guarantee of the agent. An allocation satisfies MmS fairness if each agent gets at least as much utility as her MmS guarantee. We refer to such an allocation as MmS allocation.
1
Although MmS is a highly attractive fairness concept and a natural weakening of proportionality and envy-freeness [Bouveret and Lemaître, 2014; Bouveret and Lemaître, 2015] , Procaccia and Wang [2014] showed that an MmS allocation of goods does not exist in general. This fact initiated research on approximate MmS allocations of goods in which each agents gets some fraction of her MmS guarantee. On the positive side, not only do MmS allocations of goods exist for most instances [Kurokawa et al., 2016] , but there also exists a polynomial-time algorithm that returns a 2/3-approximate MmS allocation [Procaccia and Wang, 2014; Amanatidis et al., 2015] . Algorithms for computing MmS allocations of goods have been deployed and are being used for fair division [Goldman and Procaccia, 2014] .
In this paper, we turn to MmS allocations for chores, a subject which has not been studied previously. Even in the more general domain of fair allocation, there is a paucity of research on chore allocation compared to goods despite there being many settings where we have chores not goods [Caragiannis et al., 2012] . In general, the problem of chore allocation cannot be transformed into a problem for goods allocation [Peterson and Su, 1998 ].
Contributions
We consider MmS allocation of chores for the first time and present some fundamental connections between MmS allocation of goods and chores especially when the positive utilities of the agents in the case of goods are negated to obtain a chores setting. We also show that there are differences between the two settings with no known reductions between the settings. In particular, reductions such as negating the utility values and applying an algorithm for one setting does not give an algorithm for other setting.
We show that an MmS allocation does not need to exist for chores. In view of the non-existence results, we introduce a new concept called optimal MmS for both goods and chores. An allocation is an optimal MmS allocation if it represents the best possible approximation of the MmS guarantee. An optimal MmS allocation has two desirable properties: (1) it always exists and (2) it satisfies MmS fairness whenever an MmS allocation exists (see Figure 1) . Consequently, optimal MmS is a compelling fairness concept and a conceptual contribution of the paper.
We present bounds to quantify the gap between optimal MmS fairness and MmS fairness. For chores, we present a linear-time round-robin algorithm for this purpose that provides a 2-approximation for MmS. We show that the bound proved is tight for the round robin algorithm. We also show that, as in the case of goods, the computation of an MmS allocation for chores is strongly NP-hard and so is the computation of an optimal MmS allocation.
In view of the computational hardness results, we develop approximation algorithms for optimal MmS fairness. For both goods and chores, we use connections to parallel machine scheduling and some well established scheduling algorithms to derive an exponential-time exact algorithm and a PTAS (polynomial-time approximation scheme) when the number of agents is fixed. These are the first PTAS results related to MMS. As long as an MMS allocation exists (that does exist in most instances as shown analytically by Kurokawa et al. [2016] and experimentally by Bouveret and Lemaître [2014] ), our algorithm for goods also provides a PTAS for standard MMS which in terms of approximation factor is a significant improvement over previous constant-factor approximation results [Procaccia and Wang, 2014] . 
Related Work
In addition to the literature on MmS allocations for goods discussed in the introduction, our work is based on parallel machine scheduling theory. There is a natural connection between MmS allocations and parallel machine scheduling, which we outline later. This connection turns out to be very fruitful for both exact and approximate computations of optimal MmS allocations. We briefly introduce the concept of parallel machine scheduling in the following.
We have a set M of jobs and a set [N ] of N machines. Each of the jobs has to be processed exactly once on exactly one machine without preemption. Furthermore, we have a processing time matrix P = (p ij ) i,j where p ij ≥ 0 indicates how long machine i requires to finish job j. If there are no further restrictions on the values of P , we deal with unrelated parallel machines. If p ij = p i ′ j for all i, i ′ ∈ [N ] and j ∈ M then machines are considered identical.
The goal of each machine scheduling problem is to find a schedule (i.e., an ordered allocation) that optimizes a certain objective function. The problems that we focus on in this paper either minimize the time where the latest machine finishes (this is also called the makespan of a schedule) or maximize the time where the earliest machine finishes. We show that the former objective is related to MmS allocation of chores whereas the latter is related to Mms allocation of goods. An extensive overview on all important machine scheduling problems is provided by Pinedo [2012] . Graham et al. [1979] established a notation for machine scheduling problems where P stands for identical machines, R for unrelated machines, C max for minimizing the latest machine's finishing time, and C min for maximizing the earliest machine's finishing time. According to this notation, we will use the problems P/C max , R/C max , P/C min , and R/C min in this paper. The latter problem is also equivalent to maximizing egalitarian welfare under additive utilities [Asadpour and Saberi, 2010; Bansal and Sviridenko, 2006] . All of these problems are NP-hard in the strong sense but they are well investigated and plenty of research has been conducted on approximation algorithms which we will take advantage of [Efraimidis and Spirakis, 2006; Hochbaum and Shmoys, 1987; Lenstra et al., 1990; Woeginger, 1997] .
Definitions
We introduce the basic notation and definitions for our approach in this section. For a set of items M and a number N ∈ N, let Π N (M) be the set of all N -partitions of M (i.e., item allocations) and let P(M) denote the power set of M. 
. The set of all nonnegative instances is denoted by
consisting of a set of items M, a set [N ] of N agents, and a family of additive utility functions 
. The concept of a perverse mMS allocation seems counterintuitive but turns out to be helpful to obtain results on MmS allocations for chores.
We can also relax the MmS fairness concept as follows.
1. The λ-max-min problem for I is about finding an al-
Properties of MmS Fairness
First, we present a fundamental connection between the allocation of chores (non-positive utilities) and goods (nonnegative utilities). Later in this section, we discuss nonexistence examples for MmS allocations and show that existence and non-existence examples do not transfer straightforwardly from goods to chores and vice-versa. Finally, we give a complexity result for the computation of MmS allocations for both goods and chores.
Fundamental Connection between Allocations of Goods and Chores
The following result shows an interesting connection between MmS and mMS when changing signs in all utility functions.
This leads us to the following result discussing the equivalence of MmS allocations for an instance and perverse mMS allocations for its corresponding instance.
S is an MmS allocation for I if and only if S is a perverse mMS allocation for the corresponding instance −I.

In particular, there is an MmS allocation for I if and only if there is a perverse mMS allocation for the corresponding instance −I.
Proof.
which proves both claims. This fundamental connection shows also a difference between the allocation of chores and goods since finding MmS allocations and finding perverse mMS allocations involve different objectives.
A similar statement can be made for the approximations. Proof. The proof is the same as the proof of Prop. 4.2 with just an additional factor λ on the right side of each inequality.
Non-existence and Complexity of MmS
Procaccia and Wang [2014] showed that an MmS allocation for goods does not necessarily exist. We construct an instance
+ by a subtle modification of their example to obtain an analogous result for chores. Consider a set [3] = {1, 2, 3} of three agents and a set of twelve items (represented by pairs)
We define matrices For each agent i ∈ [3], we define her utility function by
We obtain the following result by a careful adaption of the argument presented by Procaccia and Wang [2014] .
Proposition 4.4. There is no MmS allocation for −I. In particular, an MmS allocation for chores does not need to exist.
Another interesting difference between MmS for goods and chores is the fact that existence and non-existence examples for MmS allocations cannot be simply converted into each other by just changing the signs of the utility functions.
The only difference from I to the instance of the example presented by Procaccia and Wang [2014] are changed signs in the E i matrices. Let J = (M, [3] , (w i ) i∈ [3] ) ∈ I + denote their instance. We get the following interesting result.
Proposition 4.5. There is an MmS allocation for I but no MmS allocation for −I. There is no MmS allocation for J but an MmS allocation for −J.
Not only do MmS allocations not exist in general, computing an MmS allocation is strongly NP-hard if it exists. The reduction is straight forward from Integer Partition to an allocation instance in which each agent has the same utility function.
Proposition 4.6. For both goods and chores, computing an MmS allocation -if it exists -is strongly NP-hard. The problem is weakly NP-hard even for two agents.
2-Approximation for MmS for Chores
The purpose of this section is to present a polynomial-time 2-approximation algorithm for MmS for chores. Each agent is guaranted at most twice her (non-positive) max-min share guarantee.
Through the entire section, let
+ be a non-negative instance. We define u
If we are given a chores instance −I, we run a round robin protocol in which in which agents come in round robin manner and are given a most preferred available item. Framed in terms of insance I, we consider the round-robin protocol in which agents come in round robin manner and are given an available item with the lowest utility. 
Proof. The result is trivial for i = i ′ . If i < i ′ , i.e., i always chooses before i ′ , then the result is also obvious because i will choose her lowest valued item in every round and has to pick at most one item more than i ′ in total (which is compensated by u i max ). Therefore, we can assume that i > i ′ , i.e., i ′ picks before i in every round. The protocol has exactly
We separate two cases. In the case that agent i ′ has to pick an item in the last round, we have u i (r
In the other case where agent i ′ does not have to pick anymore in the last round, agent i also 2 The complexity result for goods has already been proved by Bouveret and Lemaître [2014] .
does not have to pick since she picks after i ′ . It follows that
) for all k = 1, . . . , K − 2 (picking rule).
Combining both cases, this gives us 
. The inequality cannot be improved for general instances.
Proof. By definition of the min-max share guarantee and the additivity of u i , we obtain
and
for all i ∈ [N ].
Then we have
, which proves the first part of the result.
The bound cannot be improved in general. To show this, we give an example where the bound is tight. Consider a set M = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t (N −1)·N +1 ) of (N − 1) · N + 1 items. Let the utility function u be the same for all agents with u(t j ) = 1 N for all j = 1, . . . , (N − 1) · N and u(t (N −1)·N +1 ) = 1.
Then we have mM S N u (M) = 1 because we get a (perfectly balanced) N -partition by packing N − 1 sets with exactly N of the 1 N -valued items and a last set consisting just of the one 1-valued item.
Since u is the same for all agents, the greedy roundrobin algorithm gives agent 1 the allocation S 1 = {t 1 , t N +1 , t 2N +1 . . . , t (N −1)N +1 } for which
holds true. 
Optimal MmS Fairness
Before we can introduce the optimal MmS fairness concept, we have to define an instance-specific parameter.
Definition 6.1.
For a non-negative instance I ∈ I
+ , the optimal MmS ratio λ I is defined as the maximal λ ∈ [0, ∞] for which the λ-max-min-problem for I has a solution.
For a non-positive instance I ∈ I
− , the optimal MmS ratio λ I is defined as the minimal λ ∈ [0, ∞) for which the λ-max-min-problem for I has a solution.
Note that both the maximum and the minimum exist in this definition since for a fixed instance I, there is only a finite number of possible allocations. We have the following initial bounds for the optimal MmS ratio. We do not claim that the introduced bounds of 2 3 and 2 are tight. The proof of the lemma shows another difference between MmS for goods and MmS for chores. If in the case of chores, the MmS guarantee of an agent is 0, then the utility function of this agent is equal to 0. The same result does not hold true for goods.
Based on the previous notations, we define a new fairness concept called optimal MmS, which is a natural variant of MmS fairness.
Definition 6.3. For an instance
There are two main advantages to the introduced concept. First, for each specific instance I ∈ I, we can guarantee the existence of an optimal MmS allocation.
3 Second, an optimal Mms allocation is always an MmS allocation if the latter exists. Both observations follow immediately from the definitions. We will give an introductory example for optimal MmS allocations both for goods and chores in the following.
Example 6.4. Define an instance
+ with a set [2] = {1, 2} of two agents and a set of two items M = {a, b}. We define u 1 (a) = r, u 1 (b) = 1, u 2 (a) = 1, and u 2 (b) = r for some r > 1.
We have M mS
u2 (M) = 1 which means that S 1 = {b} and S 2 = {a} is an MmS allocation for I where each agent gets a total utility of 1. The optimal MmS allocation for I would be S 1 = {a} and S 2 = {b} giving each agent a total utility of r. In particular, λ I = r. r . These examples also show that each agent's ratio of the utility in an optimal MmS allocation to the utility in an MmS allocation can be arbitrarily large (for goods) or small (for chores) as r > 1 can be any real number. Another natural question is the worst case for the optimal MmS allocation in comparison to the MmS guarantee. This is addressed by the following definition. Definition 6.5. 1. The universal MmS ratio for goods is defined as λ + := inf I∈I + λ I .
The universal MmS ratio for chores is defined as
We can give bounds for and connections between the instance-dependent optimal and the instance-independent universal MmS ratios. We presented some properties of optimal MmS allocations. But since the complexity of computing an MmS allocation for both goods and chores -if it exists -is strongly NP-hard (Prop. 4.6), the same holds true for the computation of an optimal MmS allocation. However, we will show in the next sections that there is a PTAS for the computation of such an allocation as long as the number of agents is fixed.
Exact Algorithm and PTAS for Optimal MmS Fairness (Chores)
In this section, we develop a PTAS for finding an optimal MmS allocation for chores when the number of agents is fixed. The PTAS is based on the following exact algorithm. Algorithm 7.1. Given a non-negative instance
we state an algorithm consisting of the following steps.
1. Compute c i : Proof. We will show that λ * is the minimal λ ∈ [0, ∞) for which a solution to the perverse λ-min-max problem for −I exists and S * is a corresponding solution. The claim follows then with Prop. 4.3.
Define new additive utility functions u
If c i = 0 (and therefore u i ≡ 0) for an agent i ∈ [N ], we have λ * = 0 (because we can give all items to i) and there is nothing to show. Let us now assume c i > 0 for all i ∈ [N ]. λ * is by definition the minimal λ ≥ 0 for which an allocation (S 1 , . . . , S N ) ∈ Π N (M) with u
To sum up, λ * is the minimal λ ≥ 0 for which a solution of the perverse λ-min-max problem for −I exists and S * is a corresponding solution.
There are two steps in algorithm 7.1 that are exponential in time. First, each computation of mM S N ui (M) may require exponential time and second, finding an optimal solution to R/C max may require exponential time. The computation of mM S N ui (M) for an agent i ∈ [N ] is equivalent to the computation of a job partition that minimizes the makespan on N identical parallel machines (P/C max ) where the processing time of a job j ∈ M is defined as p j := u i (j).
Hochbaum and Shmoys [1987] present a PTAS for P/C max and Lenstra et al. [1990] present a PTAS for R N /C max (which means that the number of agents is fixed to N ). This implies that we can run the following algorithm in polynomial time when the number of agents is fixed and therefore, it will be suitable to formulate a PTAS for the computation of an optimal MmS allocation when the number of agents is fixed.
Algorithm 7.3. Given a non-negative instance
+ and an ε > 0, we state an algorithm consisting of the following steps.
1. Select α > 1 and β > 1 with αβ < 1 + ε. This implies the existence of (S 1 , . . . ,
Compute c i with mM S
N ui (M) ≤ c i ≤ α · mM S N ui (M) for each agent i ∈ [N ].
Define new additive utility functions u
Since c i ≤ α · mM S N ui (M), this leads us to Proof. Set λ = λ I in 7.4 for the first result. The second statement follows since each optimal MmS allocation for I is also an MmS allocation for I if the latter exists. This is a strong result since it gives a PTAS for the computation of an optimal MmS allocation of a given chore instance, no matter if an MmS allocation exists or not (assuming the number of agents is fixed). In addition, if an MmS allocation for a chore instance exists, we have a PTAS (assuming the number of agent is fixed) to compute an MmS allocation. An analogous result for goods will be obtained in the next section.
Exact Algorithm and PTAS for Optimal MmS Fairness (Goods)
In this section, we present a PTAS for finding an optimal MmS allocation for goods when the number of agents is fixed. The PTAS is based on the following exact algorithm. The techniques for the proofs are basically the same as in the previous section. There are again two steps in Algorithm 8.1 that are exponential in time. First, each computation of M mS N ui (M) may require exponential time and second, finding an optimal solution to R/C min may require exponential time. The computation of M mS N ui (M) for an agent i ∈ [N ] is equivalent to the computation of a job partition that maximizes the minimum finishing time on N identical parallel machines (P/C min ) where the processing time of a job j ∈ M is defined as p j := u i (j).
Woeginger [1997] present a PTAS for P/C min and Efraimidis and Spirakis [2006] present a PTAS for R N /C min (which means that the number of agents is fixed to N ). 4 This implies that we can run the following algorithm in polynomial time when the number of agents is fixed.
Algorithm 8.3. Given a non-negative instance
1. Select 0 < α < 1 and 0 < β < 1 with αβ > 1 − ε. 
Compute c i with
α · M mS N ui (M) ≤ c i ≤ M mS N ui (M) for each agent i ∈ [N ]. Define a set [N ] >0 := {i ∈ [N ]|c i > 0}. 3. If [N ] >0 = ∅,
Conclusions
We initiated work on MmS allocation of chores, proposed a new fairness concept called optimal MmS, and presented interesting connections and differences between fair allocation of goods and chores. For a fixed number of agents, we proposed compelling approximation algorithms for fair allocation with respect to MmS for both chores and goods. For goods, we provided a connection between computation of MmS allocations and egalitarian welfare maximizing allocations. There is much potential for further work on the fair allocation of chores as this has largely been overlooked in contrast to the case of goods. One interesting direction are problems containing a mixture of goods and chores. For such
D Proof of Proposition 8.2
If c i = 0 for all i ∈ [N ] then we have λ * = λ I = ∞ by 6.2. So let us assume that c i > 0 for at least one i ∈ [N ]. By construction, λ * is the maximal λ ≥ 0 for which an allocation (S i ) i∈[N ]>0 ∈ Π |N>0| (M) with u holds true for all λ ∈ [0, ∞).
In summary, λ * is the maximal λ ≥ 0 for which an allocation (S i ) i∈ [N ] ∈ Π N (M) with u i (S i ) ≥ λ · M mS 
